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Summary
The core question of this study is whether senatorial chambers offer sufficient value in
addition to lower houses of parliament to justify their continuing existence The question
arises with some regularity in many West European states that still Itavc a bi-cameral
parliamentary system. More in particular, the study investigates whether the British House
of Lords, the French .*#/»«/, the Dutch f.Vrv/e Ao/wer and the German /torn/«'*™/ arc still
considered to have substantial added value with respect to the legislative process as »ell as
control of executive action. As background to this principal question, a comparative study
is made of the extent to which those senatorial chambers which arc directly democratically
legitimised (as in France), exercise their duties with regard to co-legislation and control of
executive action more effectively than senatorial clumbers which arc not (as in the United
Kingdom) or merely indirectly democratically legitimised (as in the Netherlands and
Germany).
With regard to activities that arc the domain of the upper houses as co-lcgislalors and
controllers of executive action, use is made of a conception derived from British literature
In this conception, 'bi-cameralism' implies the relation between the two chambers, in
which the upper house idcal-typically plays cither a rivalling' or an assisting' role 'Rival-
ry' is here to be taken to mean the (im)possibility for the upper house to wholly or partially
enforce its own politico-policy accents. 'Assistance' in parliamentary legislative practice
implies first and foremost correction as to lawfulness, in particular improvements of a
legal-dogmatic and legal-technical nature Suggestions for improving the effectiveness and
social desirability of legislative texts as well as their politico-bi-cameral and non-contro-
versial nature arc also placed under the heading 'assistance'.
There arc substantial differences between the four upper houses with regard to democratic
legitimisation. composition and organisation The members of the British and German
upper houses (over 700 and 69 members, respectively) arc appointed rather than elected In
the United Kingdom, they arc appointed for Life' through the head of government; in Ger-
many indirectly for an indeterminate period of time from the incumbent governments of the
sixteen /„dwtfer The members of the Dutch upper house, 75 in total, arc elected indirectly
through a system of proportional representation Finally, the members of the French .S^nar
(321) are elected through a system made up of elements of both proportional representation
and majority voting. As a result in the case of the British upper house, democratic legiti-
misation is virtually absent with regard to co-legislation and control of executive action,
whereas the /Jwrtt/ewa/ has been indirectly legitimised through the /,dn</er administrations.
For the .Sena/ and the Dutch upper house, the /->r.s7<? A'amer, democratic legitimisation, at
least in theory, may be regarded as a significant /.e//mo//v. It was found that the party-
political relations within the respective upper houses arc also influenced by the system
employed: election or appointment Until the coming into effect of the //«w.ve O/AO/Y/V /lev
1999, the British upper house was dominated quantitatively by the Conservatives. After the
majority of the Hereditary Peers had been sent off that year, the Labour government started
to appoint additional Life Peers of a non-Conservative persuasion at an accelerated pace
This created a more balanced image in a party-political sense No longer is it possible for
one of the major British political movements to automatically have an absolute majority in
the House of Lords. Such a conclusion can definitely not be drawn for the political inovc-
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mcnts represented in the .S^nor, in spite of the fact that French senators are elected rather
than appointed through free and secret ballots. Even a sudden substantial change in prefe-
rence of the electorate, a phenomenon occurring with remarkable regularity in contempo-
rary France, may only effect marginal changes in seat distribution in the Palais de Luxem-
bourg. This is a consequence of the distinctive electoral regime for the French upper house.
A number of mutually reinforcing rules in electoral legislation cause rural France to be
structurally ovcr-rcprcscntcd in the upper house. Consequently, since 1958, the centre-right
has dominated the .S'^ na/ uninterruptedly.
The degree of party-political stability of the House of Lords and the .Sena/ can never be
equalled by the /-.'ervte A'a/ner and the /Ju/irfe.vra/. In the Netherlands, virtually every change
in electoral preference on the occasion of the quadrennial elections for provincial admini-
strations has a direct and full impact on the composition of the upper house. The party-
political composition of the flwm/e.vraf is affected by the separate elections for each of the
sixteen /.rt/ir/<v parliaments Since 1972, in the majority of cases, the party-political rela-
tions in (he #M/i</e.vraf have developed opposite to' coalition relations in the ßw/ides/ag. In
the Dutch /•>rs7f A.'a/ner, finally, the opposition parties in the lower house have never had a
majority of the scats since the introduction of general suffrage.
The most important duty of (he four upper houses is co-legislation. Large differences in
legislative practice have been found Managing the legislative timetable is the prerogative
of national governments. As a rule, the lower houses have (as in France) or wish to have (as
in the United Kingdom) little influence on the composition and progress of the agenda. In
the case of the Netherlands, a fully passive attitude was found. Only the ßwwde.s/*a/ exerts
influence on a structural basis, where the legislative agenda is concerned.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, furthermore, the right of initiative is also successfully
exercised on a regular basis by the (varying majority coalitions in the) upper house. In par-
liamentary practice, the Ntfmi/ and the House of Lords are fully dependent on the good will
of the government of the day and, of course, the party-political majority in the /tese/nWee
rtafiofla/«? and the House of Commons, respectively. The Dutch £Vr5/c A'a/wer has no right
of legislative initiative.
With regard to the extent to which the four upper houses are given the opportunity to exert
genuine influence on legislative products through the very important committee phase,
again the tfumferra/ comes out on top. As a result of the certainty of continuous legislative
expertise offered by the public servants of the Ldnrfer, German senators have two opportu-
nities through committees to review bills in the course of the regular legislative process.
French senators gain expertise though an organisation specially geared for that purpose.
Each senator holds a nine-year mandate. He/she can only sit on a single permanent com-
mittee and the bills must be thoroughly prepared and monitored by rapporteurs. Aside from
the input offered on a permanent basis by the government, the thoroughness of the work by
the British committees strongly depends on the expertise that happens to be available in the
House of Lords at I hat moment, so that bills in one policy area may be paid more attention
than those in others. Strength in numbers and especially the appointment of hundreds of
new Life Peers indisputably have enhanced the intensity with which committee work is
done in the House of Lords.
The Dutch /<>r.v/e A.amer also enjoys the least favourable position where influence on
legislative products is concerned. Inasmuch as the 75 part-time senators under a four-year
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mandate arc not able to generate much time and manpower to develop 'lasting' expertise,
but especially because they have, in effect, no instruments at their disposal to amend the
substance of bills, the committee stage of the /-Vr.vft' A'«/wr am be readily left out
The main instruments available to the upper houses for the purpose of amending bills arc
the right of veto and the nght of amendment, sometimes combined with forms of dispute
settlement in order to definitively resolve any conflicts with the lower house A suspensory
veto right has proved to be of little practical value to the senate in amending bills. Both the
House of Lords and the /?um/e.srar use the instrument sparingly Of more interest is the
absolute right of veto. The äi/mtesrar and the /-."fry/«? AüwitT luve such a right, in the case of
the #i//i<fcvra/ applying to 65% of bills An absolute right of veto has shown to generate a
large preventative effect if combined with the power of intervention during preceding
stages in the legislative process This assumption was borne out unequivocally as a result of
studying the tfiWevto^'s Pfe/iar/wo/ouro//*. It was found thai amendment proposals intro-
duced by the ßum/esrar during the er.v/e /)i/nrA#flrt#' were most likely to be adopted by the
Zfamfevtoj?. even where such #um/e.vra/'s proposals were of a non-assisting' (read: politi-
cal) nature In a bi-cameral legislative system, such as that of the Netherlands, where the
right of veto will be exercised in rare cases at the end of the legislative process, preven-
tative 'tinkering' with bills based on senatorial wishes is precluded by definition However,
even in the ultimate stage of the Dutch legislative process, when the upper house is entitled
to scrutinise and assess the final product no legal basis exists for tinkering' Apart from
the odd crumb', through the nove//e construction, it docs not happen An across-the-board
yes' or no' arc the only options for Dutch senators Placed at the end of a complex and
time-consuming legislative process, and relatively closely coached by the government coa-
lition of the day, the answer is readily 'yes', even where, occasionally, it is perfectly clear
in advance that the bill is in complete breach of the rulc-of-law principle.
The .Sfrtflf and the House of Lords have a right of amendment, which is exercised on a large
scale. In French legislative practice, depending on the party-political relations of the day,
the right of amendment is found to be deployed as a 'rivalling' instrument to slow down the
process of bills that arc unwelcome. The French constitutional legislator, however, lias
provided the government with a number of legal means to reduce the effectiveness of
'rivalling' behaviour to virtually zero The right of amendment of cither house has proved
more significant as an instrument of 'assistance'. Improvement of the quality of bills is
paramount in this respect. The House of Lords in particular, but also the .S'^ na/, spend a lot
of time and energy on this. The fact that the House of Lords puts that much energy into
legislative activities of an 'assisting' nature has also something to do with dispute resolu-
tion as operative in the United Kingdom. If the House of Commons and the House of Lords
continue to disagree on the final draft of a bill, the latter may be overruled' in the end
pursuant to the PaW/ame/ir/lcfs 1911 and 1949 In France, a Q>m/m.v.v/on A//xfe /'ar//a/re,
which is a conciliation commission consisting of members of both houses, will be estab-
lished in case of dispute, before the A«e/n/>/ee naf/«/7cr/e, with the cooperation of the
government renders a final judgment on (the wording of) the bill. Also in Germany, where
the Äumfe.srar has been given powers closely resembling a nght of amendment to modify
legislative products, disputes over the wording of bills may ultimately be entrusted to a
conciliation commission (Fe/7m/f/i/ngsaw5.vcAus.y;. The ß«//jaV.wa/ has the power to still
withhold its consent (Zu5//m/nvng) afterwards in approximately 65 per cent of bills, in
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which case the bill is consigned to the dustbin. In sharp contrast with the ßwwtfc.vra/. the
House of Lords and the .S^na/ may eventually be sidelined
The above entails that in practice, the review of legislative proposals conducted by the four
upper houses under study largely takes place under the guidance of the government. In
theory, they exercise their legislative duties on the basis of a dualistic conception: in prac-
tice, however, they engage in activities that arc mainly of an 'assisting' nature. This is dif-
ferent for the Netherlands only, since the Dutch upper house has been denied any instru-
ments, in the form of a right of amendment or a derived right, to effectively render "assis-
tance' and lacks almost totally the necessary room to act in parliamentary practice.
Politically 'rivalling' activities by the upper house within the context of the legislative
process arc consistently nipped in the bud (France) or simply not tolerated (United King-
dom and the Netherlands) Only in the Federal Republic of Germany is the senate capable
of playing a 'rivalling' role in a polico-policy sense as well as an 'assisting' role where
legal-dogmatic and legal-technical considerations arc concerned It is not so much the fede-
ral structure of the /<wm/e.\rcy>u/>//£ that has caused the difference in practical operation. It is
rather a very well thought-out system of interrelated legal rules governing federal legisla-
tive procedure starting with the First /Jurd>£<v;£, through strongly professionalised perma-
nent committees and the second A>urc/i£w>£, to, where applicable, the final vote on the
outcome of the I t'r/w////MM£.«7M.v.«:Aj«.v.
There is no evidence of a strong relation between proper democratic legitimisation of the
upper house and co-legislative influence exerted by that same house. The duly democra-
tically legitimised Dutch upper house has virtually no role to play as co-legislator, whereas
it was found lliat the House of Lords, which has no democratic legitimisation whatsoever, is
now a comparatively serious 'assisting' legislative partner. Time and lasting -hence further
advancing- expertise arc major factors in this respect
Although the four senatorial houses spend most of their time by far on co-legislative duties,
they also perform others. The majority of these can be simply brought under the heading
'control of executive action'. As yet, additional control of government policy by upper
houses, under the umbrella of ministerial responsibility, has proved of little effect. The
House of Lords and the .S'^ mjf have been found to lack workable sanctioning instruments to
render such policy control effective Moreover, they are kept harmless by a rigid party-
political organisation via the usual democratic majority rules. This is also observed in the
Netherlands. As a result, the Dutch upper house spends almost no time controlling execu-
tive action This attitude of great restraint adopted by the E«?rvf<? /üwwer in relation to parlia-
mentary' scrutiny of executive action is especially remarkable, since only in the Netherlands
the relation senate-government is formally based on confidence (verfrouH'ert.yregeO.
Expressed in the terminology used here, this implies that, in the year 2001, 'rivalling'
behaviour by the upper houses in relation to vigorous control of executive action, under the
umbrella of ministerial responsibility, has nearly ceased to be a politico-strategic spearhead
in the continuous search for a workable balance, in either the Neno/. the House of Lords and
the /•>r.vft' A'rtwt'r. This in spite of all the efforts to this effect still taken on a regular basis
by the French upper house in particular In the United Kingdom and to a lesser degree in
France, the resulting deficit' in the set of controlling duties of the upper houses has been
some» hat taken up by independent investigative activities of a strongly 'assisting' nature.
To achieve this, the House of Lords and the .S^ /mr had to start operating outside the tradi-
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tional boundaries of ministerial responsibility. Independent information gathering by the
upper house is often, certainly in the beginning, fully divorced from (possible future)
government policy Precisely because of the assisting" nature of their independent inves-
tigations, for which they had to extend their duties beyond (he traditional boundaries of
ministerial responsibility, these two upper houses have proved capable of adding some sub-
stance to control of executive action w //AZ/J traditional boundaries An example would IK
EU-rclated policy views or topics relating to science and technology becoming part of the
parliamentary debate in London or Pahs.
It can be concluded that also where control of executive action is concerned the upper
houses of the United Kingdom and France act increasingly in terms of assistance' and cer-
tainly not exclusively in terms of rivalry'. For the most part, the original bi-canicral con-
cept of an effective additional check of government policy from a perspective of 'rivalry' is
obsolete and needs to be modified It was found that close party-political tics, be it within a
monist context or otherwise, in large part determine the lack of rivalling' impact, espe-
cially in the United Kingdom. France and the Netherlands The possible existence of a con-
fidence rule that can be made fully operational, is not going to counteract this effect The
near complete absence of any form of effective control by the Dutch /-Vr.\Y«' AVwnr of exe-
cutive action, as opposed to practices in the other countries under investigation, clearly
demonstrates this.
Such traditional control instruments, under the umbrella of ministerial responsibility, as the
right to pose questions (vragenrec/rf) or the right of parliamentary inquiry (em/u<>/e), have
been found to be of no effect in the hands of the upper houses with the exception of the
Äi/m/evraf. of course In general, the flKnde.vra/ is kept abreast of things by I he federal
government. This is due to the fact that the federal upper house and the federal government
are strongly interdependent, much more so than is the case in the other countries, where
legislation is concerned It must be borne in mind in this respect that it is the sixteen Adn</<rr
that must implement policies. It is therefore logical, solely from a practical angle, that the
German federal government optimally informs these executive' authorities on policy
development.
In the year 2001, the senatorial chambers, with the exception of the Dutch upper house,
continue to offer added value, particularly in the area of legislative 'assistance' In addition
to this, the British and French upper houses manifest themselves more and more effectively
in an assisting' capacity through investigative reports on a number of core policy areas, for
instance with regard to the EU. As a result, regular initiation of new legislative proposals
has become a matter of course.
In view of the above, it seems therefore reasonable to abolish the now virtually meaningless
Dutch upper house. A constitutional court will be well able to fill in the resulting gaps
Should abolition prove not to be feasible politically, then the following essential adjust-
ments to the current system should be introduced:
The number of senators should be increased They should spend more than the odd day a
week on parliamentary work. The electoral mandate must be extended in duration, so that
more expertise can be gained A certain degree of assistance by public servants is needed
These preconditions will make it more feasible to effectively give meaning to the operation
of a committee system. In that event, the Dutch upper house could engage in co-legislative
activities in an almost purely assisting' capacity modelled on the British example The
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right of veto, which has proved to be completely meaningless, may be exchanged, to this
end, for a right of veto of a suspensory nature of limited duration (as a political signal) in
combination with a right of recommittal (terw^zewdra:///). In a substantive sense, such right
of recommittal will provide the Dutch upper house with a right of amendment that can be
exercised without restraint. Ultimately, it will have to be the first house, i.e. the lower
house, as the weightiest chamber, which, through the power of amendment, determines
whether or nol amendments proposed by the upper house will be incorporated in the defini-
tive legislative product British and French bi-cameral legislative practice, incidentally, has
demonstrated that well-argued amendment proposals from the senate have proved to be
very persuasive The regime governing constitutional amendments does not need to be re-
vised so long as the Netherlands maintains a bi-cameral system
The Dutch upper house should also spend time, in future, on non-legislative activities. An
upper house that operates on the basis of a conception that is mainly of an 'assisting' nature
is excellently suited to conduct parliamentary enquiries (ert^ j/ert-.v) Furthermore, it will
prove conducive to conducting independent investigations and building the necessary areas
of expertise based on the British and French examples.
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